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An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game
Abstract: On the domain of two-sided assignment markets, the nucleolus is axiomatized
as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency (Owen, 1992) and complaint mono-
tonicity on sectors’ size. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the
nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the inter-
section between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al (1979).
Resum: En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignacio´, es presenta una axioma´tica del
nucleolus com lu´nica solucio´ que compleix les propietats de consiste`ncia respecte del joc
derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva
cardinalitat. Com a conseque`ncia obtenim una caracteritzacio´ geome`trica del nucleolus
mitjanc¸ant una propietat de biseccio´ me´s forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel
(Maschler et al, 1979).
Key words: cooperative games, assignment games, core, nucleolus
JEL: C71, C78
1 Introduction
The assignment game is a coalitional game that represents a two-sided market situation. In
this market there exists a finite set of sellers, each one with an indivisible object on sell, and
a finite set of buyers willing to buy at most one object each. Each agent has a reservation
value that is what he or she obtains if not matched with an agent on the opposite side. Every
buyer-seller pair (i, j) is attached to a real number ai j that represents the value that this pair
can attain if matched together. From these valuations, we obtain the assignment matrix A.
The worth of each coalition is the total profit that can be obtained by optimally matching
buyers and sellers in the coalition. When reservation values are null and the assignment
matrix is non-negative, our game is the one introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972).
Coalitional game theory analyzes how the agents can share the profit of an optimal
pairing, taking into account the worth of all possible coalitions. The most studied solution
concept in this model has been the core, the set of efficient allocations that are coalitionally
rational. Shapley and Shubik prove that the core of the assignment game is non-empty and
it can be described just in terms of the assignment matrix, with no need of the associated
characteristic function.
Other solutions have been considered for the assignment game: Thompson’s fair di-
vision point (1981), the kernel or symmetrically pairwise bargained allocations (Rochford
1984), the nucleolus (Solymosi and Raghavan 1994), the Shapley value (Hoffmann and
Sudho¨lter 2007) and the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets (Nu´n˜ez and Rafels 2013).
However, as far as we know, axiomatic characterizations of solutions in this framework
have been focused on the core. Axiomatizations of the core of assignment games are due
to Sasaki (1995) and Toda (2003 and 2005).
On the general class of coalitional games, the prenucleolus (that for the assignment
game coincides with the nucleolus) has been axiomatized by Sobolev (1975) by means
of covariance, anonimity and the reduced game property of Davis and Maschler (1965).
Potters (1991) also characterizes the nucleolus on the class of balanced games1 by means
of the above reduced game property. However, both aforementioned sets of axioms do not
characterize the nucleolus on the class of assignment games since the Davis and Maschler
1In fact Potters characterizes the nucleolus in a more general class of games.
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reduced game of an assignment game needs not remain inside this class. Moreover, it
seems desirable an axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game in terms of
axioms that are not stated by means of the characteristic function but by means of the data
of the assignment market.
In the present paper, on the domain of assignment games, the nucleolus is uniquely
determined by only two axioms: derived consistency and complaint monotonicity on sec-
tors’ size. Derived consistency is based on the derived game introduced by Owen (1992).
Roughly speaking, complaint monotonicity on sectors’ size only requires that at each solu-
tion outcome, the most dissatisfied agent on the short side of the market is at most as well
off as the most dissatisfied agent on the large side of the market, where we interpret the
dissatisfaction of an agent with a given outcome as the difference between his reservation
value and the amount that this outcome allocates to him.
As a by-product of the axiomatization of the nucleolus, we obtain a geometric charac-
terization of the nucleolus. Maschler et al (1979) provide a geometrical characterization for
the intersection of the kernel and the core of a coalitional game, showing that those alloca-
tions that lie in both sets are always the midpoint of certain bargaining range between each
pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this means that the kernel can be deter-
mined as those core allocations where the maximum amount that can be transferred, with-
out getting outside the core, from one agent to his/her optimally matched partner equals the
maximum amount that he/she can receive from this partner, also remaining inside the core
(Rochford 1984; Driessen 1999). We now state that the nucleolus of the assignment game
can be characterized by requiring this bisection property be satisfied not only for optimally
matched pairs but also for optimally matched coalitions.
Preliminaries on assignment games are in Section 2. Section 3 explores the property of
derived consistency. In Section 4 we prove the axiomatic characterization of the nucleolus
and deduce a geometric characterization.
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2 Preliminaries
Let U and U ′ be two countable disjoint sets, the first one formed by all potential buyers
and the second one formed by all potential sellers. An assignment market is a quintuple
γ = (M,M′,A, p,q). The sets M ⊂U and M′ ⊂U ′ are two finite sets of buyers and sellers
respectively (the two sides of the market) of cardinality |M|=m and |M′|=m′, with M∪M′
non-empty. Matrix A = (ai j)(i, j)∈M×M′ is such that for all (i, j) ∈ M×M′, the real number
ai j denotes the worth obtained by the pair (i, j) if they trade. Finally, p ∈ RM and q ∈ RM′
where, for all i ∈ M, pi is the reservation value of buyer i if she remains unpaired with
any seller (and similarly for q j for all j ∈ M′). Notice that neither ai j nor pi or q j are
constrained to be non-negative. When the market has null reservation prices we will just
describe it as (M,M′,A).
A matching µ between S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M′ is a bijection from a subset of S to a subset
of T . We denote by Dom(µ) ⊆ S and Im(µ)⊆ T the corresponding domain and image. If
i ∈ S and j ∈ T are related by µ we indistinctly write (i, j) ∈ µ , j = µ(i) or i = µ−1( j).
We denote by M (S,T) the set of matchings between S and T . Given an assignment market
γ = (M,M′,A, p,q), for all S ⊆ M, T ⊆M′ and µ ∈M (S,T ) we write
v(S,T ; µ) = ∑
(i, j)∈µ
ai j + ∑
i∈S\Dom(µ)
pi + ∑
j∈T\Im(µ)
q j, (1)
with the convention that any summation over an empty set of indices is zero.
A matching µ ∈M (M,M′) is optimal for the assignment market γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) if
for all µ ′ ∈M (M,M′) it holds v(M,M′; µ) ≥ v(M,M′; µ ′). The set of optimal matchings
for the assignment market γ is denoted by M ∗γ (M,M′).
With any assignment market γ = (M,M′,A, p,q), we associate a game in coalitional
form (M ∪M′,wγ) (assignment game) with player set M ∪M′ and characteristic function
wγ defined as follows: for all S⊆ M and T ⊆M′,
wγ(S∪T ) = max{v(S,T ; µ) | µ ∈M (S,T )} . (2)
Notice that by (1) and (2) we have that wγ({i}) = pi for all i ∈M and wγ({ j}) = q j for all
j∈M′. This assignment game, that allows for agents’ reservation values, is a generalization
of the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972) (that is, an assignment game with
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non-negative matrix and null reservation values) and was introduced by Owen (1992) and
also used by Toda (2003, 2005).
We denote by ΓAG the set of all assignment markets γ = (M,M′,A, p,q), and also, for
simplicity of notation, the set of their corresponding assignment games. Since we will deal
with consistency properties, we allow for the emptiness of one side of the market.2 The
set of assignment games ΓAG is closed by strategic equivalence. In fact, it can be shown
that every assignment game in ΓAG is strategically equivalent to an assignment game in the
sense of Shapley and Shubik.3 As a consequence, Shapley and Shubik’s results on the core
of the assignment game extend to ΓAG.
Given an assignment market γ = (M,M′,A, p,q), a payoff vector is x = (u,v) ∈ RM ×
R
M′ where ui stands for the payoff to buyer i ∈ M and v j stands for the payoff to seller
j ∈ M′. We write x|S or (u|S∩M,v|S∩M′) to denote the projection of a payoff vector x to
agents in coalition S⊆M∪M′. Also, x(S) = ∑i∈S xi, with x( /0) = 0. An imputation of γ is a
payoff vector (u,v) that is efficient, u(M)+v(M′) = wγ(M∪M′), and individually rational,
ui ≥ pi for all i ∈M and v j ≥ q j for all j ∈M′. We denote by I(γ) the set of imputations of
the assignment market γ .
The core of the assignment market is always non-empty and it is formed by those
efficient payoff vectors (u,v) ∈RM×RM′ that satisfy coalitional rationality for mixed-pair
coalitions and one-player coalitions:
C(γ) =


(u,v) ∈ RM ×RM
′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑i∈M ui +∑ j∈M′ v j = wγ(M∪M′),
ui + v j ≥ ai j for all (i, j) ∈M×M′,
ui ≥ pi for all i ∈ M, v j ≥ q j for all j ∈M′


.
2If γ is an assignment market with M′ = /0, then it is easy to see that the associated assignment game
(M,wγ ) given by (2) is the modular game generated by the vector of reservation values p ∈ RM, that is,
wγ(S) = ∑i∈S pi, for all S ⊆ M. Similarly, if γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) with M = /0, then wγ (T ) = ∑ j∈T q j, for all
T ⊆M′.
3Two games (N,v) and (N,w) are strategically equivalent if and only if there exist α > 0 and d ∈RN such
that w(S) = αv(S)+∑i∈S di. Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) be an assignment market where A = (ai j)(i, j)∈M×M′ ,
p ∈ RM , q ∈ RM′ , and let γ˜ = (M,M′, ˜A) be an assignment market with null reservation values and matrix
˜A = (a˜i j)(i, j)∈M×M′ given by a˜i j := max{0,ai j − pi − q j}, for all (i, j) ∈ M×M′. Then, as the reader can
easily check, wγ (S∪T ) = wγ˜ (S∪T )+∑i∈S pi +∑ j∈T q j, for all S ⊆M and T ⊆M′.
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Moreover, if µ is an optimal matching of γ , any core allocation (u,v) ∈ RM×RM′ satisfies
ui + v j = ai j for all (i, j) ∈ µ, (3)
ui = pi for all i ∈ M \Dom(µ), (4)
v j = q j for all j ∈M′ \ Im(µ). (5)
One single-valued selection in the core of the assignment market is the nucleolus. This
solution, that was introduced for arbitrary coalitional games by Schmeidler (1969), only
relies on the worth of individual coalitions and mixed-pair coalitions when applied to the
assignment game. Given an assignent market γ = (M,M′,A, p,q), with any imputation
(u,v)∈ I(γ) we associate a vector θ(u,v) whose components are ai j−ui−v j, for all (i, j)∈
M×M′, pi− ui for all i ∈ M and q j − v j for all j ∈ M′, non-increasingly ordered. Then,
the nucleolus of the assignment market γ is the imputation η(γ) that minimizes θ(u,v)
with respect to the lexicographic order over the set of imputations: θ(η(γ)) ≤Lex θ(u,v)
for all (u,v) ∈ I(γ). This means that, for all (u,v) ∈ I(γ), either θ(η(v)) = θ(u,v) or
θ(η(v))1 < θ(u,v)1 or there exists k ∈ {2, . . . ,mm′+m+m′} such that θ(η(v))i = θ(u,v)i
for all 1≤ i≤ k−1 and θ(η(v))k < θ(u,v)k.
3 Derived consistency and the core of the assigment game
In this section we consider a consistency property, with respect to a certain reduction of the
market, that will be satisfied not only by the core but also by the nucleolus. We begin by
introducing the concept of a solution on the domain of assignment markets. The next two
definitions follow Toda (2005).
Definition 1. Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) ∈ ΓAG. A payoff vector (u,v) ∈ RM×RM′ is feasible
if there exists µ ∈M (M,M′) such that
(i) ui = pi for all i ∈ M \Dom(µ) , v j = q j for all j ∈M′ \ Im(µ), and
(ii) ui + v j = ai j for all (i, j) ∈ µ .
In the above definition, µ is said to be compatible with (u,v). Notice that a matching
that is compatible with a feasible payoff vector need not be an optimal matching.
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Definition 2. A solution on ΓAG is a correspondence σ that associates a non-empty subset
of feasible payoff vectors with each γ ∈ ΓAG.
If γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) ∈ ΓAG, we write σ(γ) to denote the image of this assignment
market by a solution σ .
Consistency is a standard property used to analyze the behavior of solutions with re-
spect to reduction of population. Roughly speaking, a solution is consistent if whenever
we reduce the game to a subset of agents and the excluded agents are paid according to
a solution payoff, the projection of this payoff to the remaining agents still belongs to the
solution of the reduced game. Different consistency4 notions depend on the different defi-
nitions for the reduced game, that is, the different ways in which the remaining agents can
reevaluate their coalitional capabilities. Probably, the best known notion of consistency
is based on Davis and Maschler reduced game (Davis and Maschler 1965). Peleg (1986)
uses the above consistency notion to characterize the core on the domain of all coalitional
games. However, it turns out that the Davis and Machler reduced game of an assignment
game may not be an assignment game (see Owen 1992). To overcome this drawback,
Owen introduces the derived market.
Definition 3. Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) be an assignment market, /0 6= T ⊂ M∪M′, and x =
(u,v)∈RM×RM
′
. The derived assignment market relative to T at x is γT,x =
(
T ∩M,T ∩M′,AT , pT,x,qT,x
)
,
where AT = A|(T∩M)×(T∩M′) and
pT,xi = max
{
pi, maxj∈M′\T
{ai j− v j}
}
, for all i ∈ T ∩M,
qT,xj = max
{
q j, max
i∈M\T
{ai j−ui}
}
, for all j ∈ T ∩M′.
The derived assignment game relative to T at x is the coalitional game associated to the
derived assignment market γT,x, that is (T,wγT,x).
The interpretation of the derived assignment market is as follows. Once agents not
in T have left the market taking their corresponding payoff in x, the agents in T interact
in the submarket defined by the submatrix AT = A|(T∩M)×(T∩M′) but must reevaluate their
reservation values, since the outside option has been modified. Each agent i ∈ T ∩M has
4For a comprehensive survey on the consistency principles, the reader is referred to Thomson (2003).
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the choice of remaining unmatched (thus getting the original reservation value) or matching
somebody, say j, outside T , which leaves an income ai j − x j. The best of these choices
determines the new reservation value of agent i ∈ T ∩M. Similarly, agents in T ∩M′
reevaluate their reservation value.
Next we define consistency with respect to this derived market. A solution σ on ΓAG
satisfies
• derived consistency if for all γ = (M,M′,A, p,q)∈ ΓAG, all /0 6= T ⊂M∪M′ and all
x ∈ σ (γ) , then x|T ∈ σ
(
γT,x
)
.
The reader will find easily that, given an assignment market γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) and any
optimal matching µ ∈M ∗γ (M,M′), if we consider the derived assignment market relative
to a non-empty coalition T ⊆ M ∪M′ and at a core element z = (u,v) ∈ C(γ), then the
reservation value in the derived market of some agents in T can be expressed by:
pT,zi = aiµ(i)− vµ(i) for all i ∈ M∩T matched to µ(i) ∈M′ \T, (6)
pT,zi = pi for all i ∈ M∩T unmatched by µ. (7)
Similarly,
qT,zj = aµ−1( j) j−uµ−1( j) for all j ∈ M′∩T matched to µ−1( j) ∈M \T, (8)
qT,zj = p j for all j ∈ M′∩T unmatched by µ. (9)
Moreover, if µ is an optimal matching of the initial market γ , then its restriction to T is an
optimal matching for γT,z, that is,
µ|T = {(i, j) ∈ µ | i ∈ T ∩M, j ∈ T ∩M′} ∈M ∗γT,z(M∩T,M′∩T ). (10)
The reader may make use of the above statements (6) to (10) to prove that the core of the
assignment market satisfies derived consistency.
As for the nucleolus, it is known from Potters (1991) that, in the case of balanced
games, it satisfies consistency with respect to Davis and Maschler reduced game. For
assignment games, Owen (1991, page 76) proves that the derived game of an assignment
game relative to any coalition T ⊆M∪M′ and at a core allocation is the superadditive cover
of the Davis and Maschler reduced game relative to the same coalition T and at the given
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core allocation. Besides that, if a game has the same efficiency level that its superadditive
cover, then both games have the same nucleolus (Miquel and Nu´n˜ez 2010). From the
above remarks, and taking into account (10), we easily conclude that also the nucleolus of
the assignment game satisfies derived consistency.
Proposition 4. On the domain of assignment markets ΓAG, the core and the nucleolus
satisfy derived consistency.
We prove in the next proposition that, on the domain ΓAG, any solution σ satisfying
derived consistency selects a subset of the core, that is, σ(γ)⊆C(γ) for all γ ∈ ΓAG. This
result is needed in the axiomatization theorem (Theorem 7), but it is also of interest on its
own.
Proposition 5. On the domain of assignment markets ΓAG, derived consistency implies
core selection.
Proof. Let σ be a solution on ΓAG satisfying derived consistency. Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q)
be an assignment market and z = (u,v)∈ σ(γ). If M 6= /0 and M′ = /0, then feasibility of the
solution (Definition 1) implies z = p and since C(γ) = {p} we have z ∈C(γ). Similarly, if
M = /0 and M′ 6= /0, then z = q and C(γ) = {z}.
Assume now that M 6= /0 and M′ 6= /0. For all i ∈M consider the derived market relative
to T = {i} at z. By derived consistency of σ , ui ∈ σ(γ{i},z) and by Definitions 1 and 2,
ui = p
{i},z
i =max{pi,max j∈M′{ai j−v j}}, which implies that, for all i∈M, ui ≥ pi and ui+
v j ≥ ai j for all j ∈M′. Similarly, for all j ∈M′ let us consider the derived market relative to
T = { j} at z. Again by derived consistency of σ , v j ∈ σ(γ{ j},z) and, by Definitions 1 and
2, v j = q
{ j},z
j = max{q j,maxi∈M{ai j −ui}} which implies v j ≥ q j for all j ∈ M′. Hence,
z= (u,v) satisfies coalitional rationality for all mixed-pair and individual coalitions. It only
remains to check its efficiency, that is, z(M∪M′) = wγ(M∪M′).
Let µ ∈ M ∗γ (M,M′) be an optimal matching and µ ′ ∈ M (M,M′) a matching that is
compatible with z = (u,v). Notice that such µ ′ exists since z = (u,v) is a feasible payoff
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vector by Definition 2. Then,
∑
i∈Dom(µ)
aiµ(i) + ∑
i∈M\Dom(µ)
pi + ∑
j∈M′\Im(µ)
q j
≤ ∑
i∈Dom(µ)
(
ui + vµ(i)
)
+ ∑
i∈M\Dom(µ)
ui + ∑
j∈M′\Im(µ)
v j
= ∑
i∈Dom(µ ′)
(
ui + vµ ′(i)
)
+ ∑
i∈M\Dom(µ ′)
ui + ∑
j∈M′\Im(µ ′)
v j
= ∑
i∈Dom(µ ′)
aiµ ′(i)+ ∑
i∈M\Dom(µ ′)
pi + ∑
j∈M′\Im(µ ′)
q j,
where the first equality follows by simply reordering terms. By optimality of the matching
µ , the above inequality implies
∑
i∈Dom(µ)
aiµ(i) + ∑
i∈M\Dom(µ)
pi + ∑
j∈M′\Im(µ)
q j
= ∑
i∈Dom(µ ′)
aiµ ′(i)+ ∑
i∈M\Dom(µ ′)
pi + ∑
j∈M′\Im(µ ′)
q j
and thus ∑i∈M ui +∑ j∈M′ v j = wγ(M∪M′) which concludes the proof of z = (u,v) ∈C(γ).
Toda (2005) gives two axiomatizations of the core of assignment markets by means of
a consistency property (that we will refer to as Toda’s consistency) and Pareto optimality,
pairwise monotonicity and individual monotonicity (or population monotonicity). To this
end, Toda proves that any subcorrespondence of the core that satisfies Toda’s consistency
selects the whole core. Now, as a consequence of Proposition 5 above, it is straightforward
to characterize the core of assignment markets as the only solution that satisfies both afore-
mentioned consistency principles: derived consistency and Toda’s (2005) consistency.
4 Axiomatic and geometric characterizations of the nu-
cleolus
In this section, we characterize axiomatically the nucleolus on the class of assignment
games by means of two axioms, the first of them being derived consistency. Due to the
bilateral structure of the market, we look for a second axiom that guarantees some bal-
ancedness between groups. As a by-product of the following axiomatization we will derive
a geometric characterization that determines the position of the nucleolus inside the core.
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Given an assignment market γ = (M,M′,A, p,q), if j ∈M′ and (u,v) is a payoff vector,
q j − v j measures the difference between player’s j reservation value q j and the amount
v j he has been paid. Thus, the higher this difference is, the more dissatisfied the agent is
with the payoff vector. Sector M′ as a whole can measure its degree of dissatisfaction by
max j∈M′{q j − v j}, and in this way we define the complaint of a sector as the maximum
dissatisfaction of its agents. Analogously, the complaint of sector M is maxi∈M{pi−ui}.
It is worth to remark that complaint monotonicity on sectors’ size, although defined by
means of excesses of individual coalitions, is far from the definition of the nucleolus since
it does never compare these excesses across different imputations.
A solution σ on ΓAG satisfies
• complaint monotonicity on sectors’ size if for all γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) ∈ ΓAG with
|M| ≤ |M′| and all (u,v) ∈ σ(γ), then
max
i∈M
{pi−ui} ≤maxj∈M′
{q j− v j}. (11)
And similarly, if |M| ≥ |M′|, then maxi∈M{pi−ui} ≥max j∈M′{q j− v j}.
Thus, an interpretation of the axiom of complaint monotonicity on sectors’ size is the
following: the less populated sector must be at least as satisfied as the most populated one.
That is, if for instance supply is shorter than demand, the sector of sellers has a better
position in the market and this fact should be recognized by the solution outcomes. It
follows straightforwardly that if a solution has the property above and |M|= |M′|, then, at
any solution outcome, both sides of the market have the same complaint.
Note that, when imposed on solution concepts that are a core selection, the above prop-
erty is not much demanding. Indeed, for those markets that are not square, that is, markets
that have a different number of buyers than sellers, inequality (11) holds trivially at any core
allocation. And for those markets with as many buyers as sellers, complaint monotonicity
on sectors’ size selects a hypersurface. For instance, in a square Shapley and Shubik’s as-
signment game (M,M′,A), imposing complaint monotonicity on sectors’ size is equivalent
to imposing mini∈M{ui}= min j∈M′{v j} to the solution outcomes, and in general there are
still infinitely many core allocations that satisfy this equality. Figure 1 depicts the core of a
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2×2-assignment game and the piece-wise linear curve A−B−C−D formed by the subset
of core allocations at which both sectors have the same complaint.
  A
D
u1
   u2
Figure 1:
A more formal geometric interpretation of complaint monotonicity on sectors’ size for
square markets will follow after the proof of Theorem 7. It is not difficult to realize that the
midpoint between the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core allocation
(point T in the figure), that is known as Thompson’s fair division point (Thompson 1981),
satisfies complaint monotonicity on sectors’ size. On the other hand, the Shapley value
(Shapley 1953) does not satisfy this property. Next we prove that the nucleolus (denoted
by N in Figure 1) also satisfies this complaint monotonicity property.
Proposition 6. On the domain of assignment markets ΓAG, the nucleolus satisfies com-
plaint monotonicity on sectors’ size.
Proof. Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) ∈ ΓAG and let η = η(γ) be the nucleolus of the assignment
market γ . If |M| < |M′|, for any optimal matching µ ∈ M ∗γ (M,M′), there exists j∗ ∈ M′
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that is unmatched by µ . Thus, since η ∈C(γ), we have η j∗ = q j∗ , that implies
max
i∈M
{pi−ηi} ≤ 0 = q j∗−η j∗ = max j∈M′{q j−η j}.
Analogously if |M|> |M′|.
If |M|= |M′|, let ε1 =−maxi∈M{pi−ηi}=mini∈M{ηi−pi}≥ 0, ε2 =−max j∈M′{q j−
η j}= min j∈M′{η j−q j} ≥ 0 and assume, without loss of generality, that ε1 < ε2. Now de-
fine the payoff vectors
(u′,v′) = (η|M−ε1 ·eM,η|M′+ε1 ·eM
′
) and (u′′,v′′) = (η|M +ε2 ·eM,η|M′−ε2 ·eM
′
), (12)
where eM = (1, . . . ,1) ∈ RM and eM′ = (1, . . . ,1) ∈ RM′ .
It can be easily checked that (u′,v′),(u′′,v′′) ∈C(γ). Now take z = (u,v) = 12(u′,v′)+
1
2(u
′′,v′′). By substitution from (12), for all (i, j) ∈ M×M′,
ai j−ui− v j = ai j−
(
ηi +
1
2
(ε2− ε1)
)
−
(
η j +
1
2
(ε1− ε2)
)
= ai j−ηi−η j.
Thus, to lexicographically minimize the vector of ordered excesses over the set of core
allocations, we only need to consider excesses of individual coalitions.5
First,
max
{
max
k∈M
{pk−uk},max
k∈M′
{qk− vk}
}
= max
{
max
k∈M
{pk−ηk}+
1
2
(ε1− ε2),max
k∈M′
{qk−ηk}+
1
2
(ε2− ε1)
}
= max
{
−ε1 +
1
2
(ε1− ε2),−ε2 +
1
2
(ε2− ε1)
}
=−
1
2
(ε1 + ε2).
Moreover, since ε1 < ε2, we have
−ε1 = max
{
max
k∈M
{pk−ηk},max
k∈M′
{qk−ηk}
}
.
But then,
max
{
max
k∈M
{pk−uk},max
k∈M′
{qk− vk}
}
= −
1
2
(ε1 + ε2)<−ε1
= max
{
max
k∈M
{pk−ηk},max
k∈M′
{qk−ηk}
}
,
5The following property is well known (see Potters and Tijs 1992). For any n ∈ N we define the map
θ : Rn −→Rn which arranges the coordinates of a point in Rn in non-increasing order. Take now any z ∈Rp.
Then, θ (x)≤Lex θ (y)⇐⇒ θ (x,z)≤Lex θ (y,z).
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in contradiction with η = η(γ) being the nucleolus. Hence, ε1 = ε2 and this concludes the
proof.
We are now ready to state and prove the axiomatic characterization of the nucleolus.
Theorem 7. On the domain of assignment markets ΓAG, the only solution satisfying derived
consistency and complaint monotonicity on sectors’ size is the nucleolus.
Proof. From Propositions 4 and 6 we know that the nucleolus satisfies both properties. To
show uniqueness assume there exists a solution σ on ΓAG satisfying derived consistency
and complaint monotonicity on sectors’ size.
Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) ∈ ΓAG and z = (u,v) ∈ σ(γ). From Proposition 5, σ satisfies
core selection and thus z ∈ C(γ). If M 6= /0 and M′ = /0 (or M = /0 and M′ 6= /0) from
Definition 2 we have z = η . Assume then M 6= /0 and M′ 6= /0.
Let µ ∈ M ∗γ (M,M′) be an optimal matching. If µ = /0, since both z and η belong to
the core, we again have z = η . Assume then that µ 6= /0 and z 6= η . For any /0 6= S⊂M such
that |S|= |µ(S)| let us consider the derived market relative to T = S∪µ(S) at z. Notice that
under the current assumptions, such a coalition S always exists. By derived consistency of
σ , z|T ∈ σ(γT,z). Since |S| = |µ(S)|, by the complaint monotonicity on sectors’ size of σ
applied to the derived market γT,z, we have
max
i∈S
{pT,zi − zi}= maxj∈µ(S)
{qT,zj − z j}. (13)
From the definition of pT,z, we obtain
max
i∈S
{
pT,zi − zi
}
= max
i∈S
{
max
{
pi, max
k∈M′\µ(S)
{aik− zk}
}
− zi
}
= max
i∈S
k∈M′\µ(S)
{pi− zi,aik− zi− zk}
(14)
Similarly, making use of the definition of qT,z,
max
j∈µ(S)
{qT,zj − z j}= maxj∈µ(S)
k∈M\S
{q j− z j,ak j− z j− zk}, (15)
and, as a consequence, expression (13) is equivalent to
max
i∈S
k∈M′\µ(S)
{pi− zi,aik− zi− zk}= maxj∈µ(S)
k∈M\S
{q j− z j,ak j− z j− zk}, (16)
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for all non-empty coalition S ⊆ M with |S| = |µ(S)| and all z ∈ σ(γ), being σ a solu-
tion satisfying derived consistency and complaint monotonicity on sectors’ size. Since the
nucleolus also satisfies these two axioms, we have
max
i∈S
k∈M′\µ(S)
{pi−ηi,aik−ηi−ηk}= maxj∈µ(S)
k∈M\S
{q j−η j,ak j−η j−ηk}, (17)
for all /0 6= S ⊆ M with |S| = |µ(S)|. Now, from z 6= η , either there exists a non-empty
coalition S∗ ⊆M such that zi > ηi for all i ∈ S∗ and zi ≤ ηi for all i ∈M \S∗, or there exists
a non-empty coalition S∗ ⊆ M such that zi < ηi for all i ∈ S∗ and zi ≥ ηi for all i ∈ M \S∗.
Let us assume without loss of generality that the first case holds, since the proof in the
second case is analogous. That is, assume there exists /0 6= S∗ ⊆M such that
zi > ηi for all i ∈ S∗and zi ≤ ηi for all i ∈M \S∗. (18)
Notice that all agents in S∗ are matched by µ . Indeed, if there existed an agent in S∗
unassigned, i ∈ S∗ \Dom(µ), from z ∈C(γ) we would have zi = pi > ηi, in contradiction
with the nucleolus being in the core. From z ∈C(γ) follows z j < η j for all j ∈ µ(S∗), and
the reader will also check that z j ≥ η j for all j ∈ M′ \µ(S∗). Then,
max
i∈S∗
j∈M′\µ(S∗)
{pi− zi,ai j− zi− z j} < max
i∈S∗
j∈M′\µ(S∗)
{pi−ηi,ai j−ηi−η j}
= max
j∈µ(S∗)
i∈M\S∗
{q j−η j,ai j−ηi−η j}
< max
j∈µ(S∗)
i∈M\S∗
{q j− z j,ai j− zi− z j},
(19)
where the equality follows from (17). We have then reached a contradiction with (16).
Hence, z = η .
The axioms in Theorem 7 are clearly independent because the core satisfies derived
consistency on the class of assignment games but not complaint monotonicity on sectors’
size and Thompson’s fair division point satisfies the second axiom but fails to satisfy the
first one, since it generally differs from the nucleolus.
Let us remark that, under the assumption |M| = |M′|, complaint monotonicity on sec-
tors’ size can also be interpreted in geometric terms when combined with core selection.
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Notice that, by adding dummy players, that is, null rows or columns in the assignment ma-
trix and null reservation values, we can assume without loss of generality that the number
of buyers equals the number of sellers, since this does not modify the nucleolus payoff of
the non-dummy agents. Then, saying that solution σ on ΓAG satisfies complaint mono-
tonicity on sectors’ size and |M|= |M′|, is equivalent to saying
min
i∈M
{ui− pi}= minj∈M′
{v j−q j}, (20)
for all (u,v) ∈ σ(γ). Suppose now that σ(γ)⊆C(γ), where σ is a solution on ΓAG. For all
S⊆M, let the incidence vector eS ∈RM be defined by (eS)i = 1 for all i∈ S and (eS)i = 0 for
all i ∈ M \S. The vector eT ∈ RM′ , for all T ⊆ M′, is defined analogously. Take ε1(u,v) =
mini∈M{ui − pi} and notice that ε1(u,v) = max{ε ≥ 0 | (u− ε · eM,v+ ε · eM
′
) ∈ C(γ)}.
The reason is that, taking into account (u,v) ∈C(γ), for all ε ≥ 0 efficiency and coalitional
rationality for mixed-pair coalitions hold trivially for the payoff vector (u− ε · eM,v+ ε ·
eM
′
) and, as long as ε ≤ ε1(u,v), individual rationality also holds. Similarly, if we write
ε2(u,v) = min j∈M′{v j − q j}, we can check that ε2(u,v) = max{ε ≥ 0 | (u + ε · eM,v−
ε · eM
′
) ∈ C(γ)}. As a consequence, if σ satisfies core selection, then for each chosen
allocation (u,v) ∈ RM ×RM′ , the largest per capita amount that sector M can transfer to
sector M′ without leaving the core equals the largest per capita amount that sector M′
can transfer to sector M without getting outside the core. This means that core elements
satisfying complaint monotonicity on sectors’ size, when |M| = |M′|, are at the midpoint
of a certain 45◦-slope range within the core.
As a consequence of the axiomatization in Theorem 7, we can show that a stronger
form of the above bisection property characterizes the nucleolus.
Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) be an assignment market with |M| = |M′|. For each /0 6= S ⊆
M, /0 6= T ⊆ M′, |S| = |T |, we define the largest equal amount that can be transferred
from players in S to players in T with respect to the core allocation (u,v) ∈ C(γ), while
remaining in the core of γ , by
δ γS,T (u,v) = max{ε ≥ 0 | (u− εeS,v+ εeT ) ∈C(γ)}. (21)
Similarly,
δ γT,S(u,v) = max{ε ≥ 0 | (u+ εeS,v− εeT ) ∈C(γ)}. (22)
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The following geometric characterization extends the bisection property provided by
Maschler et al.(1979) to characterize the intersection of the kernel6 and the core of arbitrary
coalitional games. In the case of assignment games, it turns out that the kernel is always
included in the core (Driessen 1998). It is known that a core element of an assignment
market γ belongs to its kernel if and only if δ γ
{i},{µ(i)}(u,v) = δ
γ
{µ(i)},{i}(u,v) for all i ∈ M
assigned by an optimal matching µ of γ .
Next theorem shows that, for assignment games, if we require this bisection property
to hold not only for all optimally matched pairs but for all optimally matched coalitions
we geometrically characterize the nucleolus. The main point is that if a core element (u,v)
satisfies δ γS,µ(S)(u,v) = δ
γ
µ(S),S(u,v) for all S⊆M, then it satisfies equation (16), which has
been proved to characterize the nucleolus among the set of core elements.
This result generalizes the one given in Llerena and Nu´n˜ez (2011) for the classical
assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972).
Theorem 8. Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) be a square assignment market and µ ∈M ∗γ (M,M′).
Then, the nucleolus is the unique core allocation satisfying δ γS,µ(S)(η(γ)) = δ
γ
µ(S),S(η(γ)),
for all /0 6= S ⊆ M.
Figure 2 illustrates the above geometric characterization of the nucleolus.
u1
 u2
N
A
B
C
D
 E
F
Figure 2:
6The kernel is a set-solution concept for coalitional games that was introduced by Davis and Maschler
(1965). The kernel always contains the nucleolus.
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In light grey we represent the core of a 2× 2 assignment game in the plane u1,u2 of
the buyers’ payoffs. If we assume that µ = {(1,1),(2,2)} is an optimal matching, then the
nucleolus is the unique core allocation (denoted by N in the picture) that bisects at the same
time the horizontal segment [A,B], the vertical segment [C,D] and the 45◦-slope segment
[E,F]. The higher the dimension of the core, the more the number of bisection equalities
that must be considered.
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